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he purpose of this paper is to present 
an important set of changes which were 
implemented in the mid-nineties in the T-governmental funding arrangements of 




1 We will then examine 
preliminary evidence as to their impact. This 
is of interest since these are important items 
of public spending in both countries. The 
paper is divided in three parts. The first briefly 
presents the evolution of demographic and 
economic variables over the period for both 
countries. The second presents the health and 
                                                 
1 This paper results from a merger of the M.Sc. essays 
written by the first two authors under the supervision of 
the third author. They wish to thank Luc Vaillancourt 
for his help in merging and editing these papers. 
welfare funding reforms in both countries. The 
third examines them, compares them and 
briefly looks at their impact. 
 
1. The demographic and economic context 
in Canada and the United States 
 
In this first section, we present information on 
two economic indicators and on one 
demographic indicator: personal 
income,unemployment and -population aged 
65 and over for both countries. 
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Personal Income The Chair in American Political and Economic 
Studies (Chaire d’études politiques et économiques 
américaines; CÉPÉA; http://cepea.cerium.ca) is a 
constituent part of the Centre of International 
Studies (Centre d’études et de recherches 
internationales de l’Université de Montréal; CÉRIUM; 
www.cerium.ca). The Chair benefits from the 
financial support of Québec’s Ministry of 
International Relations (www.mri.gouv.qc.ca).  
The series « Notes & Analyses » publishes research 
briefs and more in-depth analyses, in French or in 
English, produced as part of the Chair’s activities. 
To receive these texts at time of publication, please 
register by writing us: cepea@umontreal.ca.  
Editorial responsibility for the series is shared by 
the Chair’s research team: Pierre Martin (director), 
Michel Fortmann, Richard Nadeau and François 
Vaillancourt (research directors). Responsibility for 
the contents of these “Notes & Analyses” rests 
solely with their authors. © CÉPÉA 2006 
The evolution of per capita current personal 
income in Canada from 1990 to 2000 is 
presented in Figure 1. After a relatively slow 
increase at the beginning of the decade, the 
growth rate accelerated after 1996. The 
Atlantic Provinces, particularly Newfoundland 
had the lowest per capita personal income 
throughout period, while Ontario had the 
highest. During this period, New Brunswick 
saw its per capita personal income increase 
the most (33%) while British Columbia had 



































The evolution of per capita 
personal income in the United 
States over the period is shown in 
Figure 2. There was constant 
growth throughout the decade. 
Connecticut had the highest per 
capita personal income during this 
period ($27,000 to $41,000), while 
Mississippi had the lowest 
($13,000 to $21,000). Colorado 
was the State where personal 
income increased the most (68%) 

















































In Canada, over most of the past decade, the 
Atlantic Provinces had the highest unemploy-
ment rate while the Prairies had the lowest 
rates. The unemployment rate rose until 1993 
and declined after as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 








































As shown in Figure 4, there was a reduction 
of the unemployment rate for the United 
States after 1992. Connecticut had the largest 
decrease (58%). It also had, with Virginia, the 
lowest rate (2.2% in 2000). Nebraska, with an 
increase of about 37%, was one of the few 
States for which the rate rose. However, its 
rate stayed below the American average over 
the period, not exceeding 3%. Finally, West 
Virginia, with the highest rate in 1990 and 
Alaska, highest in 2000, were two States in 
which rates stayed above the average. 
 
 










































Proportion of population over 65 years old. 
In Canada, the proportion of the population 
over 65 years old increased during the 1990s 
as shown in Figure 5. Newfoundland (9.4% to 
11.7%) and Alberta (8.8% to 10.0%) were the 
two provinces with the lowest proportion of 
elderly during the decade.  
 Newfoundland was the Canadian province for 
which the proportion increased the most. 
Saskatchewan (13.8% to 14.5%) and Manitoba 
(13.2% to 13.6%) were the two provinces with 
































































In the United States, Alaska was the state in 
which the proportion of population over 65 
years old increased the most during the 
decade, with a rise of about 40%. On the other 
hand, it remained the state with the youngest 
population of the entire country as shown in 
Figure 6. Florida was the state which had the 
highest share of older persons throughout the 
decade, with a proportion of about 18% of the 
population,. For the country as a whole, the 
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2. Funding of the healthcare and welfare 
systems in the 1990s 
 
We present in turn the American and 
Canadian health and welfare systems. We will 
focus on federal health and welfare funding 
programs that exist in both countries. The 
main reforms to such funding arrangements 
during the 1990-2000 decade will also be 
covered. It is useful to note that the Canadian 
and American health care systems differ on 
key points. In 2000, Americans spent 13% of 
their gross domestic product on health care, 
while Canadians spent 9.2%. Furthermore, 
the public finance share of total health 
spending was 70.8% in Canada, while it was 
44.3% in United States (MSSS, 1, 2003). 
Thus, publicly financed programs necessarily 
accomplish very different roles in each 
country. In Canada, the federal and provincial 
governments finance public health 
expenditures and provide care to all 
Canadians without distinctions. In the United 
States, the federal and State governments only 
furnish public health insurance to specific 
groups of people. 
 
2.1 The United States 
 
Health: 
About three-quarters of the American 
population are covered by private health 
insurance which is, for the vast majority, 
provided by their employers (OECD, 2003, 
p.8). Private spending accounts for about 60% 
of health spending in the 1990-2000 period. 
The other 40% is provided by public funds 
from the federal government (20% points for 
Medicare, 10% points for Medicaid) and state 
and local governments (10% points, mainly 
through Medicaid). The federal government is 
the sole funder of Medicare, a program 
available for individuals aged 65 and over who 
contributed for 10 years to Medicare through 
their employment. The program provides 
hospital insurance (premium free), medical 
insurance (for a monthly premium) and 
prescription drug plans (various kinds for 
various amounts)2. The federal government 
also provides funding for Medicaid, a state 
 
2 See: www.medicare.gov/  
administered program that covers low income 
individuals with variations in coverage across 
states3. Federal financing depends on both 
state income levels and state spending 
(Vaillancourt and Laurent, 2003). Since 
Medicare is only financed at the federal level, 
we will focus on Medicaid which is a cost-
shared venture between federal and state 
governments because there are no federal 
program similar to Medicare in Canada.  
 
Medicaid was established in 1965 by Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act. It provides three 
types of health protection:  
 
• Health insurance for low-income families 
with children and people with disabilities  
• Long-term care for older Americans and 
individuals with disabilities 
• Supplement coverage for low-income 
Medicare beneficiaries for services not 
covered by Medicare (e.g., outpatient 
prescription drugs) and Medicare premiums, 
deductibles and cost sharing4   
 
Being a co-financed program, states have to 
follow certain parameters about coverage 
established by the federal government. To 
receive federal funds, the state programs must 
cover these categories of persons:  
(1) Individuals meeting the requirements of 
the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program that has been in 
effect in their States since July 16,19965 
(2) Children under age 6 whose family income 
is at or below 133 percent of the Federal 
poverty level (FPL)  
(3) Pregnant women whose family income is 
below 133 percent of the FPL 
(4) Supplement Security Income (SMI) 
recipients in most States 
                                                 
3 Medicaid at a Glance 2005: A Medicaid Information 
Source, p. 6. U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
4 HCFA,1 (Health Care Financing Administration), HHS 
(U.S Department of Health & Human Services), 2000. A 
profile of Medicaid, Chart book 2000, 87p 
5 Welfare reform law enacted on July 16, 1996: 
“Congress established this eligibility group to insure 
individuals did not lose Medicaid coverage due to TANF” 
(HCFA,1, 2000, p.6)  
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(5) Recipients of adoption or foster care 
assistance under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act 
(6) Special protected groups (individuals who 
lose their cash assistance due to earnings 
from work or from increased Social 
Security benefits, but who may keep 
Medicaid for a period of time) 
(7) All children born after September 30, 1983 
who are under age 19, in families with 
income at or below the FPL 
(8) Certain Medicare beneficiaries (low-income 
Medicare beneficiaries)6 
 
State governments may also choose to provide 
Medicaid coverage for “categorically related 
groups […] (who) share characteristics of the 
mandatory groups” (CMS, 1, 2002), such as 
higher-income pregnant women and children 
defined in terms of family income and 
resources, “medically needy persons”7 
established by the states, recipients of State 
supplementary income payments, persons 
receiving long-term care and disabled people 
who do not qualify themselves under usual 
requirements. In 1998, the population covered 
by Medicaid by basis of eligibility was as 
follows8: 
 
• 18.9 million children (51%) 
• 7.9 million adults (21%) 
• 6.6 million blind or disabled individuals 
(18%) 
• 3.9 million elderly (11%)9 
 
6 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services), Medicaid: 
A brief Summary, July 2002. 
www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/overview-medicare-
medicaid/default4.asp
7 “The medically needy (MN option allows States to extend 
Medicaid eligibility to additional persons. These persons 
would be eligible for Medicaid under one of the mandatory 
or optional groups, except that their income and/or 
resources are above the eligibility level set by their State” 
(CMS, 1, 2002) 
8 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Health 
Care Financing Administration, 2000. A profile of 
Medicaid, Chart book 2000, p. 87. 
9 “For those who are dually enrolled in Medicare in 
Medicaid, Medicare serves as the primary payer, while 
Medicaid covers cost-sharing, deductibles and payment 
for care not covered in the Medicare benefits package, 
such as prescription drugs and long-term care.” (OECD, 
2003, p.12) 
States must also, to receive federal funding, 
offer basic services to groups of people: (1) 
inpatient and outpatient hospital services, (2) 
prenatal care, (3) vaccines for children, (3) 
physician services, (4) nursing facility services 
for persons aged 21 or older, (5) family 
planning services and supplies, (6) rural 
health clinics services, (7) home health care 
for persons eligible for skilled-nursing 
services, (8) laboratory and x-ray services, (9) 
pediatric and family nurse practitioner 
services, (10) nurse-midwife services, (11) 
Federally qualified health-centre (FQHC) 
services, and ambulatory services, and, 
finally, (12) Early and periodic screening, 
diagnostic, and treatment (EPSDT) services for 
children under age 21 (CMS, 1, 2002). As for 
the covered groups, state governments can 
decide to expand the quantity of health 
services provided in return for additional 
federal funding. 
 
Once the parameters of coverage and basic 
services of the federal government are met, 
each state: 
 
1. Establishes its own eligibility standards 
2. Determines the type, amount, duration, 
and scope of services 
3. Sets the rate of payment for services 
4. Administers its own program10 
 
Considerable differences among state 
programs are thus observed: “there are 
essentially 56 different Medicaid programs – 
one for each State, territory and the District of 
Columbia” (HCFA, 1, 2000, p.6). 
 
The federal government pays a share of the 
expenditures incurred by state governments,. 
The Federal Financial Participation (FFP) 
payments are made accordingly to medical or 
related administrative services and are 
intended to “fairly distribute the burden of 
financing program benefits among the states” 
(FAHCA, 2002).  
The funding comes from general revenue, not 
from trust funds as for some parts of 
Medicare. The formula-derived rate for Federal 
                                                 
10 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid: 
A brief Summary, July 2002.  
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Medicaid reimbursement is known as the 
Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage 
(FMAP). It is determined with per capita 
income by State based on a 3-year average 
compared to the national average11: 
 
Federal share = 1- State share  
 
State share = % /45% such that this ratio is 
equal to the ratio of the square of State 
average per capita Income to the square of the 
national (continental) average per capita 
income)12  
 
The federal share is therefore obtained by 
subtracting the state share from 100 percent. 
The FMAP cannot be lower than 50 percent or 
higher than 83 percent. Federal participation 
is recalculated annually. Thus, a lower income 
State will have a higher FFP, and in the same 
way, a higher income state, a lower FFP. 
(FAHCA, 2002). 
 
In 1998, for example, the federal government 
paid 50 percent of Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire and New York’s Medicaid 
expenditures, while it paid respectively 77 
percent and 74 percent for Mississippi and 
West Virginia. The former group has high 
personal income, the latter, low personal 
income. The federal government pays on 
average 57 percent of Medicaid expenditures. 
 
Many Reforms affected Medicaid program 
during the 1990-2000 decade. The beginning 
of the decade saw a growth in spending, in 
nominal dollars, of over 27 percent per year 
between 1990 and 1992 (Klemm, 2000, 
p.110). This was mainly due to the severe 
recession that meant higher levels of 
unemployed and thus more privately 
uninsured individuals. The states, already 
facing budgetary difficulties, had to find 
alternative financing mechanisms. They 
 
                                                
11 “The Federal percentage of each State (…) shall be 
promulgated by the Secretary between October 1 and 
November 30 of each year, on the basis of the average per 
capita income of each State and of the United States for 
the three most recent calendar years for which 
satisfactory data are available from the Department of 
Commerce”(CSSL, 2003) 
12 http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap07.pdf 
principally used the Disproportionate Share 
Hospital (DSH) payments13, a specific part of 
Medicaid, “which were designed to help 
hospitals with a high proportion of low-income 
(…) and, more important, not subject to the 
Federal limits that applied to all other types of 
Medicaid reimbursement” (Klemm, 2000, 
p.109). In doing this, state governments 
shifted their costs to the federal government. 
The latter reacted by enacting the Medicaid 
Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific 
Tax Amendments of 1991 that caped DSH 
payment at 12 percent of Medicaid spending 
(Klemm, 2000, p.110). In 1995, the American 
Congress examined the possibility of creating 
the Medigrant program “which would have 
ended the Federal Medicaid entitlement (FMAP) 
and capped Federal matching funds” (Klemm, 
2000, p.110). This proposition was not 
adopted, but it incited state governments to 
accelerate spending in 1995 which would have 
been the base year to calculate the blocks 
grants for Medigrant. 
 
The second half of the decade saw the most 
important reforms since the start-up year of 
Medicaid program. During the 1988–1998 
period, the share of uninsured children 
increased, mainly due to the decrease of 
employer-sponsored insurance coverage for 
children under 18 years old. A new co-
financed program, named State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), was 
initiated by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) in 
1997. It widens the medical coverage of 
uninsured, low-income children whose 
family’s income is too high for Medicaid and 
too low to afford private health plans. SCHIP 
has to be provided: 
(…) through either or both of two 
methods: (1) a program to obtain 
health insurance coverage that 
meets requirements […] relating to 
the amount, duration, and scope of 
benefits; or (2) expanding eligibility 
for children under the State’s 
Medicaid program 
(CMS, 3, 2002) 
 
 
13 “DSH accounted for 9 percent of total Medicaid 
spending in Fiscal Year 1998” (HCFA, 1, p.27) 
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Therefore, states had to choose between three 
options: expand Medicaid coverage for 
children, provide funds to children through 
separate child health programs or a combina-
tion of both (HCFA, 1, p.74). In the fiscal year 
of 1999, two million children were covered by 
SCHIP (HCFA, 1, 2000, p.72). . The BBA also 
put further restrictions on DSH payments by 
specifying state-specific allotments for the 
period 1998-2002. 
 
To fund SCHIP, the BBA also created the 
Enhanced FMAP. This new percentage is: 
“equal to the FMAP for the State increased by a 
number of percentage points equal to 30 
percent of the number of percentage points by 
which such FMAP for the State is less than 100 
percent”  
 
E-FMAP = FMAP + 30% (1-FMAP) 
 
In no case can the enhanced FMAP exceed 85 
percent. State allotments are determined in 
accordance with the statutory formula that is 
determined by the number of children 
potentially eligible to SCHIP and the State cost 




In the United States, the welfare system began 
a phase of restructuring in the early 1990s. 
Between 1993 and 1996, various waivers were 
implemented in several states. These waivers 
were made under the Aid to Family with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a 
federal program that had provided cash 
welfare to poor families with children since 
193514. These waivers permitted states to 
diverge from the national AFDC program by 
imposing new requirements on beneficiaries. 
AFDC is a cost-shared program in which “the 
federal government provides broad guidelines 
and program requirements, and states are 
responsible for program formulation, benefit 
determinations, and administration”15.  The 
 
14 Martha Coven (2002), An Introduction to TANF, Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities, p. 1. 
  Source: http://www.cbpp.org/, 02 July 2002. 
15 Administration for Children and Families, Fact Sheet: 
AFDC Program, p.1. 
portion of the cost reimbursed by federal 
government funding depends on the type of 
expenditure. The federal government 
reimburses 50% of the administrative and 
training expenses to the state. On the other 
hand, the benefits are matched by a formula. 
The matching rate  depends on the state’s per 
capita income relative to the national per 
capita income. The rates vary between 50% for 
richer states and 83%16 for poorer states.  
There are few conditions to this financing by 
the federal government, though there are 
some national guidelines that need to be 
followed. For example, to be eligible for AFDC 
benefits, a family must have at least one 
dependent child among its members. Another 
example of national standard can be found in 
the resource limitations criteria. The federal 
statute sets a maximum limit of $1000 in 
resources per assistance unit17. Resources are 
assets a family owns, such as stocks, bonds, 
etc. Another condition to be eligible for AFDC 
benefits is participation in the Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training JOBS 
program, enacted in 1988 by the Family 
Support Act to help people gain valuable skills 
in order to be employable in either new or 
better jobs. 
 
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
came into effect. This law established the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program, which replaced AFDC (the 
states had until July 1st, 1997 to submit a 
state plan and actually begin the 
implementation of the reform18). Under TANF, 
states are responsible for the design and 
implementation of their own welfare program, 
as they were in the AFDC program. Now 
though, states receive a block grant they may 
                                                                                     
  Source: 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/afdc/afdc.txt, 23 
August 2002. 
16 ACF, Fact Sheet: AFDC Program, p.3. 
17 ACF, Fact Sheet: AFDC Program, p.2. 
18 Administration for Children and Families (2002), Fact 
Sheet: Welfare, p. 3. 
  Source: 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/facts/tanfpr.htm, 02 
July 2002. 
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use at their discretion, but only for welfare 
matters19.  
 
TANF’s funding comes from a conditional 
block grant that the federal government 
provides to the states in order to help them 
finance their programs. It is a fixed total 
amount of 16.5 billion dollars per year until 
200220, not indexed for inflation. The state 
welfare programs are financed by: federal 
funds, the conditional TANF block grant 
provided by the federal government, state 
funds and the maintenance of effort (MOE) 
requirement21, which is state money. The 
TANF block grant has conditions that the 
states have to fulfill. If these requirements or 
conditions are not met, the state in question 
will have to face penalties for non-
compliance22.  
 
First, there are work requirements the states 
must meet since the main objective of the 
TANF reform is to lead people to self-
sufficiency. These include the requirement 
that beneficiaries must work as soon as job 
ready, or no later than two years after entering 
welfare23. Welfare is thus designed to provide 
temporary help to the family, while the 
parent(s) are getting ready to work again, for 
example by participating in an education 
program. In addition to this basic requirement 
are others that set global state population 
objectives24 such as minimum participation 
rates and minimum hours of work.  
 
                                                
19 The state does not have to spend all federal money on 
the benefits. They may fund educational programs, 
prevention programs, subsidize jobs, etc. 
20 After 2002, TANF was up for reauthorization. We were 
not able to find the amount of the grant after 2002. 
21 The MOE requirement is the state’s contribution to the 
TANF program: Every fiscal year each state must spend a 
certain minimum amount of its own money to help eligible 
families in ways that are consistent with the purposes of 
the TANF program. The required MOE amount is based on 
an “applicable percentage” of the state’s (non-federal) 
expenditures on AFDC and the AFDC-related programs in 
1994. 
  Source: ACF (2002), Fact Sheet: Welfare, p. 2. 
22 For a complete list of conditions and their 
corresponding penalties, please refer to the table A1 
presented in Annex-1. 
23 ACF (2002), Fact Sheet: Welfare, p. 1. 
24 Single parents with a child aged less than one year old 
may be excluded from the calculations. 
Second there is a time limit requirement. It 
was put in place to emphasize the fact that 
welfare should be a temporary form of 
assistance. In fact, states may not use federal 
funds to provide assistance to a family if it 
includes an adult or minor head-of-household 
[…] who has received assistance for a 
cumulative total of more than 60 months25. 
Third, there is the maintenance of effort 
requirement (MOE) which is what the states 
must contribute to their programs.  
 
The amount is fixed in proportion of the 
state's spending under the AFDC program. 
States must spend at least 75% of the money 
used to fund welfare programs in the fiscal 
year of 1994. If the state does not meet its 
work participation requirements, the MOE 
requirement is raised to 80%. This reform did 
not change the eligibility for the Medicaid 
program because “families meeting the 
requirements for assistance under the old 
AFDC rules continued to be eligible” (Klemm, 




In Canada, the health and welfare financing 
reforms were carried out using a single 




Both the public and private sectors have a role 
in the Canadian health system. However, it is 
the former which is responsible for providing 
most health care in Canada. The private 
sector complements public insurance. In the 
1990-2000 period, about 70% of health care 
expenditures were made by the public 
sector26.  
 
The federal government has a role in the 
Canadian health system. It sets national 
 
25 AFC (2002), TANF, Summary of Final Rule, p. 4. 
26 "Le financement des services de santé au Québec" 
(with C. Chapain), in Les systèmes de santé québécois 
Un modèle en transformation, C. Bégin et al. (eds.), PUM, 
Montréal, 1999, 101-121. 
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principles. Health Canada defines federal 
government responsibilities as follows: 
 
• Setting and administering national 
principles or standards for the health care 
system through the Canada Health Act; 
• Assisting in the financing of provincial 
health care services through fiscal 
transfers; 
• Delivering direct health services to specific 
groups including veterans, native 
Canadians, persons living on reserves, 
military personnel, inmates of federal 
penitentiaries and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police; 
• Fulfilling other health-related functions such 
as health protection, disease prevention, 
and health promotion. (HC, 1, 2003) 
 
Provinces and territories administrate their 
specific health care system. Each province 
funds its health expenditures with taxes levied 
and transfers received by the federal 
government. Health Canada defines provincial 
and territorial responsibilities as follows: 
 
• Managing and delivering insured health 
services; 
• Planning, financing, and evaluating the 
provision of hospital, physician and allied 
health care services; 
• Managing some aspects of prescription care 
and public health. (HC, 1, 2003) 
 
Other health services, such as prescription 
drug benefits, optometric services, dental 
services, chiropractic services and medical 
equipment, can be covered by provinces and 
territories outside the national health 
insurance system.  The private sector 
complements the public health system by 
providing services not covered by the 
governments. For example, cosmetic surgery 
is usually done in private clinics. However, 
“under most provincial laws, private insurers 
are restricted from offering coverage which 
duplicates that of the government programs, 
but they can compete in the supplementary 
benefits market.” (HC, 2, 2003)27
 
In 1957 the federal Hospital Insurance and 
Diagnostic Services Act was implemented: 
(CFHCC, 2002, p.2) (see table 2). Three 
conditions had to be respected by the 
provinces to be eligible for cost-sharing 
(50/50) of hospital expenses: 
Provincial plans had to: 
 
• Provide coverage to all residents of the 
province on uniform terms and conditions; 
• Include specified diagnostic services; 
• Limit co-insurance or deterrent charges so 
as to ensure that an excessive financial 
burden was not placed on patients.  
(CFHCC, 2002, p.3) 
 
The Medical Care Act was adopted in 1966. 
This new program, also known as Medicare, 
established cost-sharing (50/50) between 
federal and provincial governments for some 
non–hospital expenses, i.e. mainly physicians. 
Once again, some conditions had to be met by 
the provinces:  
 
• Administration and operation on a non-
profit basis by a public authority; 
• Coverage of all services rendered by a 
medical practitioners that are medically 
required; 
• Universal coverage of all provincial 
residents on equal terms and conditions; 
• Portability of benefits. 
(CFHCC, 2002, p.3) 
 
In the early 70s, neither the federal 
government, preoccupied by the growth of its 
social expenditures, nor provincial 
governments, worried about federal control in 
the cost-sharing program, were satisfied with 
the situation. After negotiations between the 
two levels of government, the Federal-
Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and 
Established Programs Financing Act was 
 
27 In June 2005, a federal Supreme Court judgment 
found such restrictions illegal in the case of Québec 
since they clashed with the Québec Charter of Rights 
and Freedom. This may have pan Canadian impacts but 
as of July 2005, it is too early to tell. 
 Notes & Analyses # 15  Octobre /October 2006 
 11 
adopted in 1977. It modified the mode of 
financing: transfers for hospital, medical 
services and post-secondary education were 
combined in the EPF. Transfers are intended 
“to be an equal per capita payment to each 
province” (CFHCC, 2002, p.4). Transfer funds 
come in two forms: 
Roughly half was initially paid as an 
equal per capita cash transfer. The other 
half was made available to provinces as a 
tax-point transfer. It included 13.5 
percentage points of personal income tax 
(PIT) room and one percentage point of 
corporate income tax (CIT) room. The tax 
points were equalized to the national 
average on the basis of the then prevailing 
federal equalization formula. (…) The 
federal government gained greater 
predictability in its financial commitment. 
(…) The provinces gained a reduction in 
federal administrative controls.   
(CFHCC, 2002, p.4) 
 
The mechanism of a tax-point transfer is that 
the federal government reduces its tax rates 
while provinces at the same time raise their 
own rates by an equivalent amount. The result 
is to increase provincial revenues and 
decrease federal revenues, with no impact on 
the taxpayer. The value of the tax points grows 
as the economy expands, “and the cash 
transfer was escalated by the growth rate of 
per capita GNP” (DPC, A, 2003). Another 
federal transfer associated with the EPF is the 
transfer from the Equalization Program. This 
program, created in 1957, is designed to 
“ensure that less prosperous provinces have 
sufficient revenue to provide reasonably 
comparable levels of publics services at 
reasonably comparable levels of taxation” 
(DPC, C, 2003). However, payments received 
under this program are unconditional, which 
means provinces can spend the received cash 
wherever they want.  
 
Conditions for federal funding under Medicare 
were established in 1966. To discourage 
provincial practices such as allowing extra-
billing by doctors and facility fees collected by 
hospitals that appeared in the early 80s, the 
House of Commons passed the Canada Health 
Act (CHA) in 1984. To receive their full-cash 
contribution from Ottawa, provincial 
governments must respect the criteria and 
conditions of the CHA, related to preceding 
acts: 
 
1. Public administration: the administration of 
the health care insurance plan of a province 
or territory must be carried out on a non-
profit basis by a public authority; 
 
2. Comprehensiveness: all medically necessary 
services provided by hospitals and doctors 
must be insured; 
 
3. Universality: all insured persons in the 
province or territory must be entitled to public 
health insurance coverage on uniform terms 
and conditions; 
 
4. Portability: coverage for insured services 
must be maintained when an insured person 
moves or travels within Canada or travels 
outside the country; 
 
5. Accessibility: reasonable access by insured 
persons to medically necessary hospital and 
physician services must be unimpeded by 
financial barriers or any other barriers. 
(HC, 3, 2003) 
 
Between 1990 and 1995, the federal 
government repeatedly imposed cuts in the 
amount of its transfers because of budgetary 
difficulties. In 1995, the tightening of the 
transfers culminated with the creation of the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), 
replacing both the EPF and CAP (discussed 
below under welfare programs). 
 
Starting in 1996, contributions to health care, 
post-secondary education, social assistance 
and social services would be unified under a 
single program: the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer. Federal funding would now on be as 
a block, replacing EPF and CAP, without 
distinction between health, education and 
social programs. The CHST funding, divided in 
two parts, is similar to the EPF of 1977: a part 
comes from a cash transfer, the other from a 
tax transfer, under which the federal 
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government reduced its personal (13.5%) and 
corporate (1%) income tax rates, allowing 
provinces to raise their tax rates by the same 
amount. “The CHST is allocated first of all by 
determining the total entitlements under the 
program for Canada as a whole. (…) These 
total entitlements are then allocated among the 
provinces according to their share of the 
population of Canada” (CDF, 2002, p.9).  
 
The province of Québec represents a special 
case in Canada. In the 60s, the federal 
government offered to the Canadian provinces 
“contracting-out arrangements for certain 
programs” (DPC, G, 2003). Only Québec chose 
this arrangement that is distinct of the CHST 
transfers, known as Alternative Payments for 
Standing Programs. It actually collects 
revenues from extra tax points and receives 
fewer in transfers while other provinces 
receive cash. “The Québec Abatement consists 
of a reduction of 16.5 percentage points of 
Basic Federal Tax (BFT) for all tax filers” (DPC, 
G, 2003). 
 
The total amount of the CHST transfer was 
less than the sum of the projected EPF and 
CAP transfers; thus the reform was an 
occasion for the federal government to reduce 
its transfers to provinces by about 20%. The 
1996 Budget introduced a cash floor of $11 
billion in the amounts transferred under the 
CHST to the provinces28. In 1999, the Budget 
changed the allocation formula to obtain an 
equal per capita CHST by 2001-02 across 
Canada (DPC, 2003, A). The share of the 
transfer that each province gets is also subject 
to a lot of discussion. The CHST transfer 
amounts per capita were initially unequal 
from province to province but were meant to 
converge towards a equal per capita amount. 
This occurred in 2001. 
 
Under the CHST, the provincial governments 
have only two conditions to fulfill in order to 
 
                                                28 There was a fear in the early nineties that the cash 
transfer to Québec would, because of the contracting out 
arrangements, fall to zero leaving the federal government 
with no financial leverage in the case of Québec to 
enforce the Canada Health Act .This explains in part the 
introduction of this cash floor 
retain funding from the federal government29: 
uphold the principles of the Canada Health 
Act and the absence of a minimum residency 
requirement for social assistance benefits. 
Apart from these conditions, the provincial 
governments may use the money received by 
the CHST transfer as they wish. The CHST 
thus has fewer conditions than the CAP and 
EPF, as now the provinces may modify their 
welfare program as they wish, as long as they 
do not refuse aid to new residents that left 
another province. 
DPC, B, 2003 
If a province fails one of these conditions, the 
federal government 
 “can reduce its transfer by an amount it 
considers appropriate (…) [it] may even reduce 
others transfers programs by the financial 
penalties it decides to impose on a province 
that fails to comply with a national standard ”.  




During the postwar period, the federal govern-
ment introduced various social programs. In 
1966, provincial welfare programs, which were 
subject to cost sharing with the federal 
government, were consolidated into one 
program: the Canada Assistance Plan. (CAP)30 
The federal government shared the costs of 
the provincial welfare programs on a 50-50 
basis under this program. The provinces had 
to fulfill three conditions in order to obtain 
funding under the Canadian Assistance 
Plan31: 
 
¾ Income assistance must be provided to all 
people in need, regardless of the cause of 
that need; 
¾ Provinces must have in place appeals 
system to allow welfare recipients to 
question decisions made with respect to 
their cases; 
¾ Provinces could not impose minimum 
residency requirements for welfare. 
 
29 Department of Finance Canada. Canada Health and 
Social Transfer. 
30 Battle, Ken (1998). Transformation: Canadian Social 
Policy Since 1985, Social Policy & Administration, p. 322. 
31 Battle, Ken (1998). p. 331. 
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CAP was a source of financial 
stress for the federal 
government since when a 
recession occurred, provincial 
caseloads and thus federal 
costs would increase as 
revenues dropped. In 1990, 
the federal government 
imposed a ceiling of 5% on 
annual increases in federal 
cost-sharing under the CAP 
[…] for Ontario, Alberta and 
British Columbia32. These 
provinces are the wealthiest 
in Canada and were thus 
also the non-receiving 
provinces (i.e. which did not 
receive equalization 
payments). This “cap on CAP” 
was first introduced for the 1990-91 and 
1991-92 years, but then extended until 1994-
9533. In 1995, CAP and Established Programs 
Financing (EPF)34 were abolished and replaced 
by the Canadian Health and Social Transfer 
(CHST) as described above. 
Figure 7  - Public Sector Health Expenditure per capita,four largest 




















                                                
 
3. Comparison of the reforms 
 
In Canada and the United States, the reforms 
of the federal funding of the welfare system in 
the 1990s were similar while those of the 
federal funding of health were not. Both 
federal governments stopped sharing the cost 
of welfare, introducing instead a block grant to 
cover welfare expenses. In the United States, 
the federal government set specific conditions 
and objectives that the states must follow in 
order to keep their share of the block grant 
money. In Canada, the federal government has 
 
32 Battle, Ken (1998). p. 329. 
33 Department of Finance Canada. A Brief History of the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). Source: 
www.fin.gc.ca/FEDPROV/hise.html, 16 August 2002. 
34 The Established Programs Financing (EPF) is a 
program created in 1977 to finance health care and 
post-secondary education. Rayner, John and McLarnon, 
Shauna (2001). Part 5. Fiscal Relations between the fede-
ral and territorial governments in Canada: a comprehen-
sive overview, in “Evolution of the Federal Center-
Northern regions financial relationship and its conse-
quences for "organized" migration out of the North”, p. 3. 
www.iet.ru/special/cepra/budfed/06_e.htm, 16 August 
2002. 
simply put in place a quasi-unconditional 
block grant. In the case of health, the 
Canadian reform simply modified the amounts 
available while the American ones both 
reduced the access to federal funds in one 
instance and broadened the coverage of the 
population with additional federal funds in the 
other. We first examine the health reforms 




In Canada as shown in Figure 7, the 
provincial government health care expendi-
tures were relatively stable until 1996. That 
year and the four following years, a significant 
increase for all provinces was observed. 
Newfoundland, with an increase of about 62%, 
was the province with the highest growth, 
whereas, Alberta and Saskatchewan, with 
growth of around 30%, were the provinces 
with the lowest. Manitoba, followed by 
Newfoundland and British Columbia, were the 
provinces, in 2000, with the highest public 
spending per capita. Canada, over the 1990-
2000 period, saw a public health expenditures 
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In the U.S., as shown in Figure 8, there was 
an important increase in public health 
expenditures during the 1990s. The growth for 
the entire country was 147%. The highest 
spending increase, with a growth over the 
1990-2000 period of 257%, was in Delaware, 
while Massachusetts had the lowest increase 
with 88%. Per capita spending was highest in 
New York State during that decade, moving up 
140%, from $676.95 to $1623.23. The lowest 
level was observed in Nevada, advancing from 
$122.98 to $306.25 during the 1990s. 
 
Canadian data cover the ten provinces for the 
11 years 1990-2000: a total of 110 observa-
tions. A relationship was estimated between 
the dependent variable, per capita provincial 
health care expenditures and the following 
independent variables: per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP), proportion of 
population over 65 years old, per capita 
federal transfers to provinces, unemployment 
rate and relative price of health care. 
Dummies were specified for provinces and 
years35. A Canadian Health and Social 
Transfer dummy (0 before 1995, 1 afterwards) 
was also specified to ascertain the effect if any 
of the reform of federal transfers.  
 
The results of our econometric analysis show 
that increases in per capita gross domestic 
 
                                                
35 Dummies for Ontario and year 2000 were dropped 
product or per capita federal 
transfers increased provincial 
health care expenditures 
while the proportion of the 
population over 65 years old, 
the relative price of health 
care and the unemployment 
rate variables had no impact 
on this spending. The CHST 
reform variable had a positive 
and significant impact on 
health expenditures. This 
result may seem surprising 
because total federal 
transfers to provinces were 
tightened by this reform but 
the reform allowed provinces 
to spend the former CAP 
share of the CHST on health 
at a time when welfare use was going down.  
Figure 8 - Medicaid and SCHIP Expenditures per capita, for Benefits and DSH payments, by 































Econometric analysis: Health Reforms - United 
States 
 
The data for United States cover the 50 states 
for the 1993-1998 period (300 observations). 
Estimates for the complete decade could not 
be made given that total health expenditures 
data was only available for the 1990-1998 
period and that the federal transfers to State 
data was only available for the 1993-2000 
period36. A relationship was estimated 
between the dependent variable per capita 
state public health care expenditures and the 
following independent variables: per capita 
GDP, proportion of population over 65 years 
old, per capita federal transfers to states, 
unemployment rate and relative price of 
health care. Dummies were specified for states 
and years 37. A Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
dummy was also specified, to observe the 
effect of the reform on health expenditures. 
 
State public health expenditures are positively 
related to federal transfers, unemployment 
rates and per capita GDP, while the proportion 
of population over 65 years had no impact. 
 
36 Estimates were made for the 1993-2000 period with 
the available variables, but results did not differ 
significantly from 1993-1998 estimates. 
37 Dummies for California and year 1993 were dropped. 
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The positive impact of the 
unemployment rate variable 
is not surprising since the 
Medicaid program was 
enacted in 1965 to cover 
eligible poor people. Holahan 
and Garret (2001) find that 
an increase of the 
unemployment rate generally 
raises the enrolment and 
costs of Medicaid. Finally, the 
Balanced Budget Act variable 
had a positive impact on 
public state health care 
expenditures. This is to be 
expected since the reform 
required states to increase 
spending for children. This 
finding should be interpreted with caution, 
considering that this reform took place in 
1998 and that the studied period ended this 
same year. 
 
Figure 9: Welfare Participation, Unemployment and Relative Benefits, 





















In the US, the main objective of the welfare 
reform was to push families towards self-
sufficiency with the focus more on the end 
result (self-sufficiency of families) than on the 
way the states would accomplish it. Thus, the 
conditions imposed to the states were 
conditions of performance. This can clearly be 
seen in the Final Rule document of the 
Administration for Children and Families38: 
 
They [the principles governing the 
final rule] reflect PRWORA’s strong 
focus on moving recipient to work 
and self-sufficiency, and on ensuring 
that welfare is a short-term, transi-
tional experience, not a way of life. 
 
They [the principles governing the 
final rule] do not tell the States how 
to design their TANF programs or 
spend their funds. At the same time, 
 
38 Administration for Children and Families, Summary, 
Final Rule, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) Program, p. 1. Source: : 
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/exsumcl.htm, 15 
August 2002. 
the rules hold the States accountable 
for moving families towards self-
sufficiency. 
 
In Canada, conditions are almost absent. The 
goal of the federal government was to reduce 
its spending, not to reduce welfare caseloads. 
The provinces are now faced with the full cost 
of extra spending on welfare and the full 
financial benefits of reduced spending since 
CHST funds are fungible while CAP funding 
was not. Provincial governments will be 
searching for ways to diminish their 
caseloads.   
 
The two different reforms may thus have a 
similar effect. The American reform imposes 
goals on the states, but lets them choose how 
to fulfill them. The direct result should be a 
decline in the welfare caseloads. The Canadian 
reform changes the nature of the funds 
available to the provinces, which may have the 
indirect effect of making them reduce their 
caseloads. 
 
Figures 9 (United States) and 10 (Canada) 
present the evolution of welfare participation 
over the 1990s.39
                                                 
39 Data sources : For the U.S. (figure 9): Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for unemployment rate and calculations by the 
authors for the others; for Canada (figure 10): CANSIM 
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conometric analysis40: Welfare reforms – 
e examine whether the welfare caseload—the 
he reform variables, waiver and TANF, had a 
                                                
Figure 10 shows that the American welfare 
participation rate (ratio of the number of 
welfare recipients to labor force) has been 
declining ever since the introduction of 
waivers in the beginning of 1990s. Welfare 
participation rates have decreased in all 
states. It has continued to decline with the 
introduction of TANF in 1997. However, the 
unemployment rate and the relative benefits 
(ratio of welfare to minimum wage) have also 
declined for most of the period. This means 
that welfare recipients might have had more 
opportunities to work than in the past and 
that welfare has become relatively less 
advantageous than work, Further analysis is 
thus needed to confirm that TANF indeed has 
had a significant impact on the caseloads and 
that the decline in welfare participation rate is 
not simply due to the good performance of the 
American economy. 
 
In Canada, welfare participation rates have 
declined in the second half of this past 
decade, along with a drop in unemployment 
and in the relative benefits. Note that it is still 
less advantageous to be on welfare in the 
United States than in Canada in 2001, as the 
relative benefits ratio in the United States 
were at 0.6 and 0.9 in Canada. In 
Newfoundland and Saskatchewan, welfare 
participation rates have risen and not 
declined. In other provinces, the declines are 
not as dramatic as the ones observed in the 
United States. This might suggest that we will 
have stronger reform effects 
in the United States than in 
Canada. 
 
Econometric analysis: Welfare 
reforms – Canada 
 
In the case of Canada, welfare 
caseload—the dependent vari-
able—is explained by the 
following independent varia-
bles: CHST reform, the 
relative value of benefits—i.e. 
the ratio of benefits (for a 
single-parent with a child in 
Canada) / minimum wage 
(monthly amount assuming 
30 hours per week for 4.33 
weeks)-, and unemployment. Dummies were 
specified for years and provinces. We have 120 
observations: 10 provinces during 12 years. 
The replacement of CAP by the CHST has no 
impact on the welfare caseload. Unemploy-
ment has a significant and positive impact on 
caseload while the relative value of benefits 
had no impact. 
 
 
Figure 10: Welfare Participation, Unemployment and Relative Benefits,



























dependent variable—is explained by the 
following independent variables: TANF reform, 
waivers, the relative value of benefits—i.e. 
benefits (maximum for a family of three in the 
United States,)/ minimum wage (monthly 
amount assuming 30 hours per week for 4.33 
weeks)—and unemployment rate. Dummies 
were specified for states and years In this 
case, we have two sets of observations, for a 




negative effect on the number of caseloads 
with the TANF having a stronger effect. The 
block grant having many conditions attached 
to it, the states are obliged to find ways to 
reduce their caseloads in order to keep funds. 
 
40 Detailed results are found in Rault (2003) at:  
http://hdl.handle.net/1866/162  
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onclusion 
udied the determinants of health 
or the healthcare system, the onset of the 
or the welfare system we have found that the 
                                                
We also find that when unemployment 
increases and when the benefits are more 
advantageous relative to the minimum wage, 
the caseload increases but these variables are 
not statistically significant. The result from 
the study of the American reform is that about 
15% of the decline in caseloads is attributable 
to TANF, and another 5% to AFDC waivers, for 
a total of about 20% of the decline attributable 
to the welfare reform. These results are 
comparable to the results obtained by the CEA 
in 1999. In this report, the CEA found that 
TANF has accounted roughly for one-third of 
the reduction from 1996 to 199841 (18% of 
which is attributable to TANF and the rest to 
state waivers from AFDC rules). 
 
Healthcare and Welfare Reforms in the 
United States and Canada in the 
1990s: Description and Evaluation 
 
Summary: Canada and the United States both saw 
changes in the federal government financing of health and 
welfare spending by respectively their provinces and 
states in the nineties. This note describes these changes 
and examines their impacts. It shows that while the 
Canadian government moved towards less conditional 
grants, this was not the case of the United States, 
particularly in the area of welfare. Changes in the United 
States had the predicted effect: more funds for healthcare 
increased public health spending and more restrictions on 
access to welfare reduced welfare participation rates. 
Changes in Canada increased health spending. 
C
This paper st
care expenditure and welfare caseloads of 
Canadian provinces and American states in 
the nineties period then tried to determine if 
both countries’ federal funding reforms had an 
impact on spending or caseload. 
 
F
Canadian Health and Social Transfer in 1996 
had a positive and significant impact on 
provincial spending as did the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 on state health 
expenditures. One interesting difference is 
that an increase in unemployment increases 
state spending but not provincial spending, 
reflecting the last resort nature of public 
health insurance in the United States as 
opposed to the universal nature of that 
program in Canada. 
 
F
conditions imposed on subnational entities 
were strong in the United States, and almost 
inexistent for Canada. Hence, the main finding 
that the American reform has led to a 
significant decline in caseloads, while the 
Canadian reform has not is not surprising. 
Our results tend to show that a federal 
government looking to attain certain specific 
objectives through financial transfers will 
obtain better results by financing the recipient 
 
rom these results, we can conclude that the 
41 CEA (1999), p. 2. 
governments by a conditional grant than by 
an unconditional one. 
 
F
effects of reforms in the United States in 
health and welfare funding are stronger in 
terms of modified behavior than the ones in 
Canada. One possible explanation is that the 
American public health and welfare system 
are more of a last resort option than in 
Canada; the target population of the American 
program is single parents with at least one 
child. These recipients may be much less 
responsive to economic incentives and much 
more responsive to welfare reforms where new 
conditions are imposed. 
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